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Abstract
We examine zero-knowledge protocols working in non-commutative structures. Specifically, we
will discuss the advantages and disadvantages of using invertible elements and elements that
have a square root. An adaptation of the zero-knowledge protocol will be presented for working
in symmetric groups and monoids of endomorphisms and matrices. Additionally, the security
behind these zero-knowledge protocols will be discussed as well as showing different scenarios
where invertible elements and elements with squares are vulnerable to attacks.
1 Background
1.1 Overview
Throughout this paper, we will discuss the concepts behind zero-knowledge protocols as they pertain
to cryptography. We will refer to the honest prover as the person holding a particular piece of
information that should not be divulged, the verifier who does or does not believe a statement,
the trusted center as the authority that establishes the setup requirements, and the cheating prover
as the person trying to convince the verifier they are an honest prover. We will call the honest
prover Peggy, the verifier Victor, the trusted center Trudy, and the cheating prover Eve. In the
following section, we will examine the general setup and exchange on the original scheme written
in Zn developed by Uriel Feige, Amos Fiat, and Adi Shamir.
1.2 Zero-Knowledge Protocols
The Feige-Fiat-Shamir Identification Protocol, also known as the original zero-knowledge protocol
(ZKP), was first published in 1988 in the Journal of Cryptology [1]. The main concept behind the
ZKP is to allow a prover to prove something to a verifier while limiting the amount of information
that is conveyed. For example, suppose Peggy lives in a red house in California and Victor lives in
Virginia. Peggy will convince Victor that her house is red, without ever sending Victor a picture of
her house. Peggy uses a ZKP to limit impersonation since anyone is able to send Victor a picture
of a red house. Therefore, Victor and Peggy will trust each other and Eve will not have enough
information to impersonate Peggy.
To begin, we will establish the general setup and exchange of this ZKP working in Zn mul-
tiplicatively, where n is the product of two large prime numbers. Before the verification begins,
Peggy and Victor agree on how many times, m, the process is repeated. Below the setup and
exchange will be described for one round.
FFS ZKP: the setup.
1. Trudy chooses two large distinct prime numbers, p and q, and sets n = pq. Trudy
publishes n to the general public, but does NOT publish p or q.
2. Peggy creates a secret number a and reduces it mod n.
3. Peggy computes b where b ≡ a2 mod n. When Peggy is ready to communicate with
Victor she will send him the element b corresponding to her a.
Note. Victor is not able to recover a by the difficulty in determining a modular square
root in Zn without knowledge of the factors of n.
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FFS ZKP: the exchange.
1. Peggy chooses a random integer r and computes s ≡ r2 mod n. She sends s to Victor.
2. Victor chooses a random bit t where t ∈ {0, 1}. Victor then sends his bit to Peggy.
Note. Peggy will not know what t is until after she sends Victor her s.
3. Peggy computes y ≡ rat mod n. She sends y to Victor.
4. Victor confirms that y2 ≡ sbt mod n. Victor will only accept the response if y2 ≡
sbt mod n.
Note. Since Zn is a commutative ring, we have (ra)2 = r2a2. Substituting all of these expressions
into the equation y2 ≡ sbt, we will either get:
(ra)2 ≡ r2a2 ≡ sb1 in the case t = 1
r2 ≡ sb0 in the case t = 0.
Therefore, Victor will accept that Peggy is a true prover if y2 ≡ sbt for every round.
It is important to note the significance of selecting a random t. This step is the most vital since
it will determine the value Victor expects to receive. It is essential for Victor to randomly choose
this bit so Peggy does not always receive the same value for t. If Victor sends the same value
every time, it will allow an impersonator to trick Victor into believing she is a valid prover with
a success rate of 100%. This attack process will be discussed in Section 1.3. Below is an example
demonstrating this ZKP in Zn. This paper will only demonstrate one round of the ZKP exchange,
but recall that Peggy and Victor agree on m exchanges before the verification begins. The value
for m can be unique for each verification between two different people.
Example 1.1. The following example demonstrates the general setup and exchange in Z327287.
1. Trudy selects p = 509 and q = 643 and calculates n = 327287. Trudy publishes Z327287 to
Peggy and Victor.
2. Peggy creates a secret number a = 58469.
3. Peggy calculates b ≡ a2 ≡ 111246 mod 327287. She sends Victor b because she is ready to
communicate with him.
Next, Peggy and Victor participate in the exchange outlined above.
1. Peggy chooses r = 41685 and computes s ≡ r2 ≡ 72542 mod 327287. Peggy sends s to Victor.
2. Victor chooses t = 1 and sends his bit to Peggy.
3. Peggy computes y ≡ rat ≡ 41685 · 584691 ≡ 301263 mod 327287. Peggy sends y to Victor.
4. Victor checks that y2 ≡ sbt and will believe Peggy if and only if they are equal. He computes
y2 ≡ 3012632 ≡ 91773 mod 327287
sbt ≡ 72542 · 111246 ≡ 91773 mod 327287.
Victor believes Peggy since y2 ≡ sbt.
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In the following example, we will notice the slight difference when Victor chooses t = 0. This
process will reveal Peggy’s secret r, but for each round of the exchange Peggy will choose a different
r value. Victor will never be able to discover the secret value a Trudy creates because a is never
isolated and cannot be discovered due to the hardness of finding a modular square root.
Example 1.2. This example uses the previous setup, but will demonstrate the difference when
Victor chooses t = 0.
1. Peggy chooses r = 96521 and computes s ≡ r2 ≡ 78986 mod 327287. Peggy sends s to Victor.
2. Victor chooses t = 0 and sends his bit to Peggy.
3. Peggy computes y ≡ rat ≡ 96521 · 584690 ≡ 96521 mod 327287. Peggy sends y = r to Victor.
4. Victor checks that y2 ≡ sbt and will believe Peggy if they are equal. He computes:
y2 ≡ 965212 ≡ 78986 mod 327287
sbt ≡ 78986 · 1112460 ≡ 78986 mod 327287.
Victor believes Peggy since y2 ≡ sbt.
In addition to not revealing any information, any strong ZKP must satisfy two more requirements:
completeness and soundness. Since ZKPs must have these we are able to classify a ZKP under the
category of an interactive proof system.
Definition 1.3. An interactive proof system is a system wherein two parties continuously exchange
messages until the verifier has received an answer from a prover and is convinced that it is correct.
The exchange is repeated a certain number of times until the verifier is convinced he is com-
municating with an honest prover. Any practical ZKP would satisfy the following two properties,
taken from [4]:
Completeness - For every r ∈ Zn, the verifier always accepts the outcome s after interacting
with the prover on common input r.
Soundness - For some s that is not a square, the verifier accepts the outcome with a probability
of at most 12m after interacting with the prover on a common input.
This protocol is considered complete since an honest verifier will always be convinced of a true
statement from an honest prover. Similarly, the exchange is sound since a cheating prover can
convince an honest verifier that some false statement is actually true with only a small probability.
The general setup of the ZKP only exists if one-way functions exist, such as squaring mod n. A
cheating prover should not be able to obtain any additional information that is not already known
as public.
1.3 Security and Attack
This zero-knowledge protocol is used today because of the main feature of the ZKP: the prover will
not disclose any information to the verifier during the verification process. This concept provides
a more secure way of communication. As discussed in the previous section, the properties of
completeness and soundness convey the fact that a verifier will always accept the outcome when
3
communicating with an honest prover. Also, it is extremely unlikely that a cheating prover will be
able to convince the verifier of a false statement.
Using these two conditions, we can determine the minimum number of rounds m needed to prove
communication with an honest verifier. As discussed in the definition of soundness, the verifier will
accept the false outcome with a probability of 12m when completing m rounds of the protocol. For
example, to show that there is less than a 1% chance that Victor verified a false statement, we
must solve for m:
1
2m
≤ 0.01
2−m ≤ 0.01
ln(2−m) ≤ ln(0.01)
−m ln(2) ≤ ln(0.01)
−m ≤ ln(0.01)
ln(2)
m ≥ 6.64.
Therefore, after 7 rounds of the exchange, there is less than a 1% chance that Victor verified a false
statement.
There is one known attack on this ZKP. In this attack, Eve is impersonating Peggy; Victor
believes he is talking to Peggy. However, this attack is only effective 50% of the time. To successfully
execute this attack, Eve must correctly predict the value Victor is going to choose for t. Remember,
Victor does not choose t until after Eve sends Victor s.
If Eve believes Victor is going to choose t = 0, then she will follow the normal exchange. We
recall that when t = 0, y2 = s. However, if Eve changes her r, this will result in an s that will not
equal y2. If Eve believes Victor is going to choose t = 1 at the very beginning, then she will send
Victor s′ = sb−1 instead of s = r2.
This is the main reason why Victor must randomly choose his t value. If he always chooses
t = 1, then Eve will send s′ = sb−1 for every round. If he always sends t = 0, then Eve will not
change her value for s.
Example 1.4. For this example, we will use the same setup as in Example 1.1.
1. Eve chooses r = 63251 and computes s ≡ r2 ≡ 260000 mod 327287. Eve believes t = 1 so she
sends s′ = sb−1 to Victor instead, where s′ = 15189 mod 327287. This value is disguised as
r2.
2. Victor chooses t = 1 and sends his bit to Peggy.
3. Since Victor chose t = 1, Eve will send Victor y = r.
4. Victor checks that y2 ≡ sbt. He computes:
y2 ≡ 632512 ≡ 260000 mod 327287
sbt ≡ 15189 · 1112461 ≡ 260000 mod 327287.
Victor believes Eve is Peggy since y2 ≡ sbt.
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Note. This exchange only worked since Eve correctly guessed that t = 1. This exchange
would not have worked if Victor chose t = 0 because the following calculations would have
been made:
y2 ≡ 260000 mod 327287
sbt ≡ 15189 · 1112460 ≡ 15189 mod 327287.
Victor would not believe Eve is Peggy because y2 6≡ sbt.
In the following example, Eve correctly guesses the value of t. As opposed to Example 1.4, Eve
will choose t = 0 instead of 1. As discussed earlier in this section, Eve does not have to manipulate
the exchange in any way if she correctly predicts t = 0.
Example 1.5. For this example, we will use the same setup as in Example 1.1 and a similar
exchange as in Example 1.4.
1. Eve chooses r = 63251 and computes s ≡ r2 ≡ 260000 mod 327287. Eve sends s to Victor.
2. Victor chooses t = 0 and sends his bit to Peggy.
3. Eve computes y ≡ rat ≡ 63251 · 584690 ≡ 63251 mod 327287. Eve sends y to Victor.
4. Victor checks that y2 ≡ sbt:
y2 ≡ 632512 ≡ 260000 mod 327287
sbt ≡ 260000 · 1112460 ≡ 260000 mod 327287.
Victor believes Eve since y2 ≡ sbt.
Note. This exchange only works if Eve correctly guesses that t = 0. This exchange would
not have worked if Victor chose t = 1. This is because y2 ≡ r2 ≡ sb0.
We will now look at an example where Eve incorrectly guesses the value of t. Since she in-
correctly guesses the value of t, Victor will know she is not an honest prover and will therefore
discontinue his communication with her.
Example 1.6. For this example, we will use the same setup as in Example 1.1.
1. Eve chooses r = 63251 and computes s ≡ r2 = 260000 mod 327287. However, Eve assumes
that t = 1 so she sends s′ = sb−1 to Victor instead, where s′ = 15189 mod 327287.
2. Victor chooses t = 0 and sends his bit to Peggy.
3. Eve guessed incorrectly. Therefore, no matter what value she sends for y, the statement will
NEVER be verified. Eve sends y = 63251 to Victor.
4. Victor checks that y2 ≡ sbt:
y2 ≡ 632512 ≡ 260000 mod 327287
sbt ≡ 15189 · 1112460 ≡ 15189 mod 327287.
Victor does not believe Eve since y2 6≡ sbt. In this example, y2 ≡ r2, but sbt ≡ sb−1b0 ≡ sb−1.
Thus, r2 6≡ sb−1 and Victor knows he is not talking to an honest prover.
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This is the only known attack for this ZKP. However, this attack does not always work, because
Eve has only a 50% chance per round of correctly predicting t. Therefore, the likelihood that Eve
would be able to convince Victor that she is an honest prover is a different probability than that
for Peggy in convincing Victor that she is an honest prover. Eve has a probability of convincing
Victor she is an honest prover of only 12m . Peggy has a probability of 100% of convincing Victor
she is an honest prover since she will never have to worry about guessing the value for t or solving
the modular square root problem.
2 Zero-Knowledge Protocol over Symmetric Groups
Throughout this section and the rest of this paper, we will examine the setup and exchange of a
zero-knowledge protocol in a non-commutative setting. Instead of focusing on commutative struc-
tures, we will shift our attention to non-abelian groups and eventually non-commutative monoids.
Specifically, we will focus on symmetric groups, endomorphisms of finite sets, and matrices. We
believe these three structures will potentially increase the security of our ZKP and therefore make
it harder for Eve to impersonate an exchange.
2.1 Non-commutative ZKP over Symmetric Groups
The setup and exchange of ZKP over symmetric groups is very similar to the setup and exchange
of ZKP in Zn. We recall that the symmetric group Sn is non-abelian when n ≥ 3; however, for
this exchange to work, Peggy must make some choices that depend on commutativity, though the
overall structure is still non-commutative.
ZKP over Sn: the setup.
1. Peggy and Victor agree upon an Sn for fixed n.
2. Peggy creates a secret permutation a.
3. Peggy computes b where b = a2. When Peggy is ready to communicate with Victor she
will send him the permutation b corresponding to her a.
ZKP over Sn: the exchange.
1. Peggy chooses a random permutation r in Sn that commutes with a and computes s = r
2.
She sends s to Victor.
2. Victor chooses a random bit t where t ∈ {0, 1}. Victor then sends his bit to Peggy.
3. Peggy computes y = rat. She sends y to Victor.
4. Victor confirms that y2 = sbt. Victor will only accept the response if y2 = sbt.
Note. Notice here that r and a must commute with one another. This is the most important rule
when working with this ZKP. The group does not need to be commutative itself, but the private
elements a and r must commute with one another. They must commute with one another in order
for the math to work and for the corresponding answer to equal y2.
Theorem 2.1. Victor will always correctly verify an exchange over Sn when a and r commute with
one another.
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Proof. For Victor to always correctly verify an exchange he must confirm that y2 = sbt. We know
that y2 = (rat)2. This expression will simplify to ratrat. Peggy will always create an r that
commutes with a, so the expression can be rearranged to equal rratat. Now we can write the like
terms with exponents to equal r2a2t which we know will either equal sb when t = 1 or s when
t = 0.
When working in symmetric groups, there is an easy way to create commuting elements; how-
ever, this technique leaves room for Eve to easily impersonate Peggy. This technique revolves around
splitting the set {1, 2, . . . , n} into two equal halves, typically {1, 2, . . . , n2 } and {n2 +1, n2 +2, . . . , n}.
When Peggy originally creates her secret permutation a she will only transform the first half of
the set, while leaving the second half fixed. Then, when Peggy is creating her random permuta-
tion r she only transforms the second half of the set while leaving the first half fixed. These two
permutations will always commute with one another. Peggy could also randomly choose half of
the elements to permute for a and the other half to permute for r. This process will also satisfy
ra = ar.
Example 2.2. The following example demonstrates how to create two permutations that commute
in S8.
1. Peggy creates the secret permutation a by manipulating the values for 1-4 and fixing the
values for 5-8, for example a =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 4 1 3 5 6 7 8
)
.
2. Peggy creates the random permutation r by manipulating the values for 5-8 and fixing the
values for 1-4, for example r =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 2 3 4 8 7 6 5
)
.
3. Consequently, the resulting products ra and ar will equal:(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 2 3 4 8 7 6 5
)(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 4 1 3 5 6 7 8
)
=
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 4 1 3 8 7 6 5
)
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 4 1 3 5 6 7 8
)(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 2 3 4 8 7 6 5
)
=
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 4 1 3 8 7 6 5
)
.
Peggy will have access to both of these values so she can begin communicating with Victor.
We will call this the splitting method.
Another way to find commuting elements is by brute force. Although this method is more
tedious, it adds a level of security since it can be harder for Eve to find elements that commute
with a given permutation. After Peggy finds two elements that commute, the exchange in this
ZKP will directly resemble the ZKP from Section 1.2. In the example below, we will work with
two elements that were found to commute by brute force.
Example 2.3. The following example demonstrates the general setup and exchange in S6. In this
example, Victor will choose t = 1, although Peggy is not aware of this until after she sends Victor
her permutation s.
1. Peggy and Victor agree to work in S6.
2. Peggy creates the secret permutation a =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6
4 3 6 2 1 5
)
.
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3. Peggy calculates b = a2 =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6
4 3 6 2 1 5
)(
1 2 3 4 5 6
4 3 6 2 1 5
)
=
(
1 2 3 4 5 6
2 6 5 3 4 1
)
.
Peggy will send Victor b when she is ready to communicate with him.
Next, Peggy and Victor participate in the exchange outlined above.
1. Peggy chooses r =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6
6 1 4 5 3 2
)
(confirming that ra = ar) and computes
s = r2 =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6
6 1 4 5 3 2
)(
1 2 3 4 5 6
6 1 4 5 3 2
)
=
(
1 2 3 4 5 6
2 6 5 3 4 1
)
.
Peggy sends s to Victor.
2. Victor chooses t = 1 and sends his bit to Peggy.
3. Peggy computes y = ra1 = ra:(
1 2 3 4 5 6
6 1 4 5 3 2
)(
1 2 3 4 5 6
4 3 6 2 1 5
)1
=
(
1 2 3 4 5 6
5 4 2 1 6 3
)
.
Peggy sends y to Victor.
4. Victor must check to see if y2 = sb1. If they do equal one another, then Victor will believe
that he is talking to Peggy. Victor computes the following:
y2 =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6
5 4 2 1 6 3
)(
1 2 3 4 5 6
5 4 2 1 6 3
)
=
(
1 2 3 4 5 6
6 1 4 5 3 2
)
sbt =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6
2 6 5 3 4 1
)(
1 2 3 4 5 6
2 6 5 3 4 1
)
=
(
1 2 3 4 5 6
6 1 4 5 3 2
)
.
Victor believes Peggy since y2 = sbt.
The security behind this ZKP in Sn relies on the hardness of finding a root in Sn and finding
an element r that commutes with a. However, if Eve is able to find any element r that commutes
with a she is able to successfully impersonate Peggy.
Theorem 2.4. Eve is able to impersonate Peggy if she can always efficiently find any square root
of b. She does not need to find the correct square root, only a root that equals b when squared.
Below is a table showing whether a parameter is public or private. This table will be a helpful
reminder as to how we establish an attack working in the ZKP for Sn.
parameter public private
a X
b X
r X
s X
t X
y X
y2 X
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From the table, we recall that a and r are the only private elements in this ZKP. We also recall
that b = a2 and s = r2. In the general setup discussed in Section 1.2, we recall that it is quite
difficult to find a modular square root. However, there is a known method for finding a root if a
permutation is a square. From here, if Eve is able to find an element r that commutes with the
root a she is able to successfully impersonate Peggy. Eve will always be able to create such an r
by using a power of a.
Proof. For Victor to believe he is talking to an honest prover, he must be able to verify that
y2 = (rat)2. During the exchange process, Eve will first find a permutation r that commutes with
a. From here, Victor will either choose t = 0 or t = 1. He will always be able to successfully verify
that he is talking to an honest prover since (rat)2 = r2a2t which will always simplify to sbt. Hence,
if Eve is able to find any root of b, when that permutation is squared it will always equal b. We
previously showed why a and r must commute with one another. Therefore, if Eve is able to find
any root of b and can find an element r that commutes with this root, she will always be able to
impersonate Eve.
Unfortunately, if Eve is able to find a square root and an element r that commutes with this
square root, she can impersonate Peggy with a success rate of 100%. We will establish a criteria
for finding a root of a square permutation in the next section.
2.2 Square Roots of Permutations
In this section, we will show the process for finding a root of a permutation. We will discuss disjoint
cycles and how the cycle structure will lead to a procedure to find a root. We will refer to the
length of a permutation with the variable q. We will also discuss even and odd cycles.
Proposition 2.5. If α and β are disjoint cycles then αβ = βα.
Since a permutation has a unique representation as a product of disjoint cycles, we can use the
product of disjoint cycles to determine if a permutation will have a root or not. In this ZKP, we
can guarantee that we will always be working with square permutations since b is the result of a2;
however, it is always safe to confirm the criteria.
Theorem 2.6. A permutation has a square root if and only if the number of disjoint cycles of the
same even length in its cycle decomposition is even.
Proof. This is required because the square of a cycle with even length 2q will split the cycle into
two even length disjoint cycles of length q. On the other hand, the square of a cycle with odd
length will still be a cycle of the same length. It is important to pay special attention to a square
of a cycle with even length. After decomposing a permutation into its disjoint cycles, if there is
not an even number of disjoint cycles of the same even length, then the permutation cannot be a
square.
Example 2.7. Suppose a permutation in S8 is decomposed into the following disjoint cycles:(
1 3 7
) (
2 4
) (
5 8
)
.
This permutation has one cycle of length three, two cycles of length two, and one cycle of length
one. Therefore, this permutation is a square since it has an even number of cycles of length two.
Thus for a permutation to be a square, it must have an even number of cycles of the same even
length; it does not matter the number of odd cycles since every odd cycle will always be a square.
In the example below we will not have a square permutation.
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Example 2.8. Suppose a permutation in S10 is decomposed into the following disjoint cycles:(
1 4 8 5
) (
2 10 3 7
) (
6 9
)
.
This permutation has two cycles of length four, and one cycle of length two. Therefore, this
permutation is not a square since it does not have an even number of cycles of length two.
Using the two previous results, we can establish a theorem and a technique for finding a square
root for permutations.
Theorem 2.9. Let σ be a permutation in Sn which has a square root. To find a square root of
σ, the first step is to decompose σ into its unique product of disjoint cycles. The next step is to
separate the cycles into groups of same length cycles. Finally, the root will be constructed by using
the process below for odd and even length cycles.
1. Decompose the permutation into its product of disjoint cycles.
2. Check to make sure all cycles of any even length occur in an even number. That is, make
sure there is an even number of length two cycles, an even number of length four cycles,
etc.
3. For the even cycles, we take the even number of cycles of the same even length and group
them together in pairs. Suppose there are two cycles c and d of even length q:
c =
(
e1 e2 e3 ... eq−1 eq
)
d =
(
f1 f2 f3 ... fq−1 fq
)
.
Then we define √
c | d = (e1 f1 e2 f2 ... eq fq) .
4. For every odd cycle c =
(
e1 e2 e3 ... eq−1 eq
)
the formula for finding a root is as
follows: √
c =
(
e1 e(q+3)/2 e2 e(q+5)/2 ... eq e(q+1)/2
)
.
5. Finally, we have our root by combining all of the resulting cycles together.
It is important to note that the resulting square root will not have the same number of disjoint
cycles as the original permutation. This is mainly because the result of squaring a cycle of even
length w is two cycles each of length 12w. It is also important to note that if an element goes to
itself, e.g. σ(3) = 3, then the element has a root where 3 goes to itself.
Below we will examine a case where Eve impersonates Peggy and convinces Victor she is an
honest prover. Eve is able to accomplish this because she uses the above procedure for finding a
square root and then she is able to find a permutation that commutes with her newly discovered
square root.
Example 2.10. Peggy and Victor agree upon working in S8. Peggy is ready to start communicating
with Victor so she sends him b =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
7 6 8 3 2 5 4 1
)
. Eve sees this information and decides
she would like to impersonate Peggy so she begins communicating with Victor. She must act quickly
and find a square root before Peggy continues her communication with Victor. First, she finds a
square root for b using the procedure we just described.
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1. This permutation decomposes into the following product of disjoint cycles:
b =
(
1 7 4 3 8
) (
2 6 5
)
.
2. Since both of these disjoint cycles are of odd length, Eve recalls the formula for finding a root
of an odd length cycle:
√
c =
(
e1 e(q+3)/2 e2 e(q+5)/2 ... eq e(q+1)/2
)
. The first cycle
has q = 5 and will have the following root:(
1 3 7 8 4
)
.
The second cycle has q = 3 and will have this root:(
2 5 6
)
.
3. Finally, Eve finds the final root by taking the disjoint root cycles and writing them as one
product. Here is the root permutation Eve finds when given b:
a′ =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
3 5 7 1 6 2 8 4
)
.
4. Using a brute force attack, Eve is able to find a permutation that commutes with a′. She
finds r =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4 5 1 8 6 2 3 7
)
. She double checks to make sure a′r = ra′.
5. Eve squares r and sends Victor s:(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4 5 1 8 6 2 3 7
)(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4 5 1 8 6 2 3 7
)
=
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
8 6 4 7 2 5 1 3
)
= s.
6. Victor thinks he is talking to Peggy, and he sends Eve t = 1.
7. Eve calculates y = ra1 and sends this value to Victor. She gets
y =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 6 3 4 2 5 7 8
)
and sends this to Victor.
8. Victor confirms that y2 = sb1.
He calculates y2 =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 5 3 4 6 2 7 8
)
.
He calculates sb =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 5 3 4 6 2 7 8
)
.
Victor believes he is talking to Peggy since y2 = sb. He will continue communicating with
“Peggy” because he is very confident that he is talking to an honest prover.
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2.3 Vulnerabilities of Using Symmetric Groups
This zero-knowledge protocol using symmetric groups has some advantages and disadvantages.
At the beginning of this section, we discussed the differences of working in Zn versus Sn. We
know that Zn is commutative while Sn is a non-abelian group. The difference between working
in commutative versus non-commutative structures may add a layer of security that benefits the
non-abelian groups.
We discussed at the beginning of this section the procedure for creating a ZKP with symmetric
groups. The main difference between the ZKP in Zn and the ZKP in Sn is Peggy is always able
to find an r that commutes with a in Zn since this ZKP is working in a commutative setting.
This is where the layer of added security may be found, since Peggy has to work to find an r that
will commute with a in Sn. This is a property that will be found when establishing a ZKP for
any non-abelian group. As previously shown, there are two methods that Peggy can use to find
a commuting element: splitting a permutation into two halves or by brute force. There are other
methods that can be used to find a commuting element, such as raising a permutation to some
power. We will briefly discuss this method at the end of this section.
Each of these methods has their own disadvantages. The splitting method is open to an attack
that could be used with the square root attack described in the previous section. If Peggy creates
her a value by using the splitting method, then the corresponding public value b will also only have
half the elements fixed and it will be the same half.
Example 2.11. Suppose Peggy and Victor have agreed to work in S8. Peggy has decided to create
her value for a by manipulating the values for 1-4 and fixing the values for 5-8. Suppose that
a =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4 1 2 3 5 6 7 8
)
.
The corresponding permutation b = a2 will be:(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4 1 2 3 5 6 7 8
)(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4 1 2 3 5 6 7 8
)
=
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
3 4 1 2 5 6 7 8
)
.
From here, Eve is able to find a square root using the square root attack. Eve is also able to find
a commuting permutation r much more easily because the resulting permutation will have fixed
values for 1-4 and manipulated values for 5-8. This process as a whole will take less time for Eve to
execute because it will take less time to find a square root and the process of finding a commuting
permutation r is much simpler.
Example 2.12. Suppose that Peggy sends Victor b =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
3 4 1 2 5 6 7 8
)
. If Eve would
like to impersonate Peggy she must find a root for b and a commuting element r for the root a′. To
find a root for b, she will decompose b into its product of disjoint cycles and then use the procedure
discussed in Section 2.2. Eve finds that a′ =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 3 4 1 5 6 7 8
)
. Eve must now find an r
that commutes with a′. This will be easy for her to do because she notices that Peggy used the
splitting method to create her a. Eve creates r by manipulating the values for 5-8 and fixing the
values for 1-4. She decides on r =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 2 3 4 8 5 6 7
)
. This process did not take Eve very
long and now she can successfully impersonate Peggy.
12
The splitting method is not as safe to use because it will make impersonating Peggy very feasible
and not time consuming. The brute force method is safer to use because manipulating all of the
values for a permutation makes it harder to find a commuting permutation. On the flip side,
sometimes it is too difficult or time consuming to find a commuting permutation this way. If Peggy
is not able to find a commuting permutation then she will have to restart the communication with
Victor which will make him slightly skeptical.
There is another method to finding a commuting permutation, but this method could also leave
Victor doubtful. When Eve finds a square root a an easy way to find a commuting r is to raise a
to some power. This can be suspicious to Victor if he realizes Eve is using this procedure.
Example 2.13. Suppose Eve has found a =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
3 5 7 1 6 2 8 4
)
. From here, if Eve calcu-
lates powers ak she can easily choose a commuting permutation. We show a table of a2 through a5
and their permutations below.
Power of a Resulting permutation
a2
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
7 6 8 3 2 5 4 1
)
a3
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
8 2 4 7 5 6 1 3
)
a4
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4 5 1 8 6 2 3 7
)
a5
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 6 3 4 2 5 7 8
)
Eve should be careful and choose a power of a where the next power does not have many elements
going to themselves. This is because Victor could become distrustful about the validity of such a
permutation.
In addition to the disadvantages of the splitting method and brute force, we found an attack
for finding a square root of a permutation. As stated previously, if Eve is able to find a square root,
not necessarily the root that Peggy used, she will always be able to successfully impersonate Peggy
when communicating with Victor. The only problem with this attack is Eve has to quickly find a
square root and a commuting permutation and must start her communication with Victor before
Peggy does. However, this is a problem for most attacks where time is an issue; for example, with
the man in the middle attack.
3 Zero-Knowledge Protocols over Monoids
Throughout the rest of this paper we will focus our attention on creating ZKPs for monoids. We
will specifically examine ZKPs for endomorphisms of a finite set and n × n matrices over finite
fields. First we will begin by discussing monoids and some benefits and special characteristics that
arise when working with monoids instead of groups.
3.1 Monoids
Based on the evidence presented for the disadvantages of the ZKP working with symmetric groups,
we can conclude that this ZKP is not safe to use. We were able to create an attack on this ZKP by
targeting the vulnerability of squares in Sn. We can conclude that developing a ZKP for Sn leaves
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room for impersonation. To create less vulnerable ZKPs we could shift our attention to structures
that are not only non-abelian, but also not groups.
Definition 3.1. A monoid is a set M with a binary operation ∗ such that the operation is closed,
is associative, and contains an identity element e.
Some known monoids include, but are not limited to: the set R, the set Z, the set Q, and the
set C which can all be formed under addition or multiplication. The set of all n× n matrices can
be formed over a ring with either matrix addition or multiplication. The set of endomorphisms can
be formed under composition. Our basic contention is the following:
Claim 3.2. It is safer to use monoids instead of groups.
This is because there is no easy way to manipulate the exchange by multiplying an element with
its inverse to result in the identity, which would simplify the math. Working with non-invertible
elements will also prevent a cheating prover from recovering an original element since there is no
known easy method for finding a root of a non-invertible element.
Example 3.3. We have already shown the process for finding a root while working in Sn. We were
able to do this because we could decompose the permutation into its product of disjoint cycles. If
we are working with non-invertible functions, we would not necessarily be able to do this because
we could not decompose it. Suppose that b =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 5 6 8 3 5 1 4
)
. We could attempt to
decompose this function, but not every grouping will be a cycle. For instance, with b as above one
would try: (
4 8
) [
7 1 2 5 3 6 5
]
.
The first grouping is a cycle; however, the second grouping is not a cycle since 5 appears twice and
the second time 5 appears it will not continue the cycle structure. Therefore, since this is not a
product of disjoint cycles, we cannot find a root using the procedure from Section 2.2; however,
there could possibly be another method.
Proposition 3.4. Every group is a monoid.
A group G is a set that is closed under an operation ∗, in which the operation is associative,
contains an identity element, and every element has an inverse. Therefore, a group is a special type
of monoid where every element is invertible. It is important to state that since every group is a
monoid, a monoid can be thought of as a group but without the inverse axiom.
Example 3.5. The set Zn under multiplication is a good example of a monoid. This works because
in Zn not every element has an inverse, yet the operation is still associative and has an identity.
This monoid is the basis of the original ZKP.
Definition 3.6. Let M be a monoid. If for x ∈ M there is some y ∈ M so that x ∗ y = e = y ∗ x
then we say x is a unit and y is its inverse.
In ALL instances, we can construct a group from a monoid. Using this definition, we can create
the simplest group formed from a monoid by selecting only elements that are units in M .
Theorem 3.7. If M is a monoid, then M∗ = {x ∈M | x is a unit} is a group under the operation
of M .
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Proof. Assume M is a monoid. Let x, y ∈ M∗. Then, x has an inverse x−1 and y has an inverse
y−1. We claim that y−1x−1 is the inverse to xy. We must show the products (y−1x−1)(xy) and
(xy)(y−1x−1) will both result in e. Considering the first product, we have:
(y−1x−1)(xy) = y−1ey
= y−1y
= e.
The other is proven similarly:
(xy)(y−1x−1) = xex−1
= xx−1
= e.
Hence, xy ∈M∗. Therefore, since the associativity and identity axioms hold from the definition of
a monoid and every element x is invertible in M∗, M∗ is a group.
Corollary 3.8. Every ring R with identity gives a monoid under multiplication. Then R∗ is known
as the group of units of the ring R.
3.2 Endomorphisms
First, we will look at a class of monoids known as endomorphism monoids.
Definition 3.9. The endomorphism monoid En is the set of all functions f : {1, 2, ..., n} →
{1, 2, ..., n} under composition.
When creating the ZKP over endomorphisms we will construct the protocol the exact same way
that we established the ZKP over symmetric groups.
ZKP over En: the setup.
1. Peggy and Victor agree upon an En.
2. Peggy creates a secret element a.
3. Peggy computes b where b = a2. When Peggy is ready to communicate with Victor she
will send him the element b corresponding to her a.
ZKP over En: the exchange.
1. Peggy chooses a random element r in En that commutes with a and computes s = r
2.
She sends s to Victor.
2. Victor chooses a random bit t where t ∈ {0, 1}. Victor then sends his bit to Peggy.
3. Peggy computes y = rat. She sends y to Victor.
4. Victor confirms that y2 = sbt. Victor will only accept the response if y2 = sbt.
Note. Notice here that r and a must commute with one another.
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As discussed in Section 2.2 we exhibited an attack on the ZKP over symmetric groups. There
is a similar attack for the ZKP over endomorphisms. This attack will also revolve around finding a
square root for an endomorphism. The attack we displayed in the previous section worked because
everything was invertible. This is not the case here. We did a literature search on this problem
for endomorphisms and found nothing that was simple and concise. The only result we found was
non-trivial: the paper [2] describes a technique for finding a square root of any endomorphism.
Similar to the attack for the ZKP over symmetric groups, Eve will only be able to execute
it if she is able to find a commuting element r. Eve is still able to find a commuting element
by raising the element to some power; however, this trick does not necessarily work that well in
endomorphisms because the powers will eventually become fixed. If Eve is looking for a non-fixed
element she will have a harder time finding a commuting element in a monoid since elements of a
monoid are not necessarily invertible.
Example 3.10. Suppose Eve is trying to find a commuting element for
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
3 4 6 2 3 6 7 2
)
.
She is not able to invert this transformation because this transformation is not one-to-one and is
not onto. She is also not able to use arbitrary powers of this transformation, because they will
eventually alternate between two transformations, as in:
a2 =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
6 2 6 4 6 6 7 4
)
a3 =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
6 4 6 2 6 6 7 2
)
a4 =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
6 2 6 4 6 6 7 4
)
a5 =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
6 4 6 2 6 6 7 2
)
.
Here we can tell that all odd powers are the same as are all even powers. Eve would not be able to
use any of these powers because this could be suspicious to Victor.
3.3 Matrices
The last monoid we will examine is n × n matrices defined under matrix multiplication. We will
focus most of our attention on M2(Z2) which will contain all invertible and non-invertible matrices.
This is the smallest possible monoid of matrices to analyze and only contains 16 different matrices.
The setup and procedure for the ZKP over matrices is identical to the setup and procedure for
endomorphisms. We will establish the setup and exchange for the monoid of all matrices Mn(Zp)
for any n and prime p.
ZKP over Mn(Zp): the setup.
1. Peggy and Victor agree upon a positive integer n and prime p.
2. Peggy creates a secret matrix a.
3. Peggy computes b where b = a2. When Peggy is ready to communicate with Victor she
will send him the matrix b corresponding to her a.
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ZKP over Mn(Zp): the exchange.
1. Peggy chooses a random matrix r in Mn(Zp) that commutes with a and computes s = r2.
She sends s to Victor.
2. Victor chooses a random bit t where t ∈ {0, 1}. Victor then sends his bit to Peggy.
3. Peggy computes y = rat. She sends y to Victor.
4. Victor confirms that y2 = sbt. Victor will only accept the response if y2 = sbt.
Note. Notice here that r and a must commute with one another.
We may potentially exploit this procedure by analyzing the different square roots produced by
looking at M2(Z2). We stated earlier that we will look at both the invertible and non-invertible
matrices. There are 16 different matrices in M2(Z2); however, there are only 10 different squares.
We will list all of the squared matrices below and we will also include the corresponding matrices
that are roots.
Number Squared matrix Invertible? Root(s)
1
[
0 0
0 0
]
no
[
0 0
0 0
]
,
[
0 0
1 0
]
,
[
0 1
0 0
]
,
[
1 1
1 1
]
2
[
0 0
0 1
]
no
[
0 0
0 1
]
3
[
0 0
1 1
]
no
[
0 0
1 1
]
4
[
0 1
0 1
]
no
[
0 1
0 1
]
5
[
1 0
0 1
]
yes
[
0 1
1 0
]
,
[
1 0
0 1
]
,
[
1 0
1 1
]
,
[
1 1
0 1
]
6
[
0 1
1 1
]
yes
[
0 1
1 1
]
7
[
1 0
0 0
]
no
[
1 0
0 0
]
8
[
1 0
1 0
]
no
[
1 0
1 0
]
9
[
1 1
0 0
]
no
[
1 1
0 0
]
10
[
1 1
1 0
]
yes
[
1 1
1 0
]
In M2(Z2) there are 10 possible square matrices; three of these matrices are invertible while
the other seven are non-invertible. There is a known formula for finding the number of possible
invertible matrices for a given p when working in Mn(Zp).
Theorem 3.11. The number of different invertible matrices in Mn(Zp) is given by
n∏
k=1
pn − pk−1.
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As we showed earlier, there are three unique invertible squared matrices and six different in-
vertible root matrices. We could also calculate this using the above formula:
2∏
k=1
p2 − pk−1 = (p2 − 1)(p2 − p)
= (22 − 1)(22 − 2)
= 6.
We have already calculated this by showing all of the possible matrices for M2(Z2). This is
helpful when working in Mn(Zp); however we are only able to determine the number of different
invertible root matrices and not the number of unique squares.
Theorem 3.12. The number of non-invertible square matrices in Mn(Zp) is given by
pn
2 −
n∏
k=1
pn − pk−1.
Note that we want this number to be as big as possible for securing our ZKP over Mn(Zp).
Example 3.13. Suppose we were working in M2(Z5). We can calculate the number of invertible
square matrices by using our formula:
2∏
k=1
p2 − pk−1 = (p2 − 1)(p2 − p)
= (52 − 1)(52 − 5)
= 480.
We also know that there are 625 possible matrices in M2(Z5). Therefore, we know that there are
145 square matrices that are non-invertible. However, we do not know how many unique squares
these matrices produce. Thus, if Eve is given a non-invertible square matrix, she could have a very
difficult time finding a root for the given square. For some numerical evidence on the “rarity” of
invertible matrices, the following table counts the number of invertible matrices in Mn(Z2) relative
to the size of the entire monoid.
n Number of matrices Number of invertible matrices Percentage of invertible
2 16 6 37.5%
3 512 168 32.8%
4 65,536 20,160 30.8%
5 33,554,432 9,999,360 29.8%
As shown in the table above, the percentage of invertible elements stays relatively small as n
increases. As we have explained before we do not know how many unique squares these invertible
elements yield. Therefore, working in Mn(Z2) might be a viable option since there may be fewer
invertible matrices.
We did a literature search on the problem of finding a square root of an invertible matrix over
a finite field. The only result we found was the paper [3]. Here the author gives only a count for
the number of square roots of the identity matrix: the results do not hold for arbitrary squares,
nor does the author give a procedure for producing a square root. Therefore, this appears to be
the most secure ZKP we have created and analyzed in this thesis.
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It is safe for us to conclude that using monoids instead of groups may potentially add a layer of
security. Although the endomorphism monoids En we examined had a known method for finding a
square root, the solution is non-trivial and its complexity unclear. As we proved, it is much easier
for Eve to impersonate Peggy when they agree to work in Sn. We are unsure how hard it would be
for Eve to impersonate Peggy when working in an arbitrary monoid, but based on our literature
searches it seems likely to be more difficult than when working with symmetric groups.
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